

CONFIDENTIAL

Approved For Release 2004/03/26 : CIA-RDP80M01133A000700050009-8

DCI/IC 75-1507  
12 February 1975

MEMORANDUM FOR: General Wilson

SUBJECT: The Future of the USIB Intelligence Information  
Handling Committee and the IHC Support Staff

1. At a time when we are all more than straight out to respond to Presidential and Congressional inquiries, I am sorry to have to ask your further consideration in connection with providing significantly improved staff support for the IHC. There now exists a serious imbalance between my assigned responsibilities and the capabilities provided to accomplish the IHC mission.

2. My efforts alone, no matter how energetic, cannot solve this problem, and those efforts have exacted an increasingly severe physical price. It would be rash to continue in this manner.

3. The attached memorandum provides my analysis of the IHC's mission, the Committee's history, and our current circumstances. Attachment 4 makes a specific proposal for augmented staffing now.

4. I would very much like to continue in my present position. The existing circumstances amount to a "no win possible" situation, both for me and for the cause of improved community coordination.

25X1

5. Your guidance is requested.

Chairman, IHC

25X1

Approved For Release 2004/03/26 : CIA-RDP80M01133A000700050009-8

CONFIDENTIAL

12 FEB 1975

SUBJECT: The Future of the USIB Intelligence Information Handling Committee and the IHC Support Staff

1. A cardinal point of military command doctrine enjoins a commander who receives a mission that he cannot accomplish effectively to make timely representations to his superiors. The doctrine continues that the result will be either to change the commander or the mission and/or to provide additional capabilities and resources. This is the current problem of the USIB/IHC and its Support Staff (IHC/SS). I respectfully request that this be considered as a matter of some priority.

2. The current mission of the Chairman, IHC is to carry out with a suitable degree of effectiveness the tasks assigned by DCI Directives 1/4 and 1/15, both dating from the late 1960s (Attachment 1). Although they contain a few words that are no longer directly applicable to current conditions, they still present a balanced listing of the universe of information handling and presentation tasks where the DCI today should be manifesting a strong influence and playing a leading role in coordinating these matters for the community.

a. Those directives were the result of extensive study and community discussion that was first evoked by the President's Board of Foreign Intelligence Advisors (PFIAB). Their report led the President and the National Security Council to endorse their findings, and the Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs (W. W. Rostow) instructed the DCI to implement a plan for coordinating community information handling. This is NSAM 368 (National Security Action Memorandum) of 9 February 1968 (Attachment 2).

b. After hundreds of hours of community staff work, the DCI and USIB made responses to the President, excerpts of which are contained in Attachment 3.

c. One action taken was to establish the Intelligence Information Handling Committee (IHC) with a revised DCID 1/4, which latter directive continues unchanged to the present date. To illustrate the IHC mission, the DCID covered research and development, education and training, and security aspects of information science and information handling; it enjoined the IHC to foster community systems involving automation for data

handling and data flow, i.e., communications; it called for an inventory of systems, the rendering of assistance to organizations with automation problems (e.g., other USIB committees), the stimulation and implementation of improvements in information flow for indications and warning and for substantive analysis; it cited the IHC as a focal point for developing community relations with external organizations, research institutions, contractors, et al. who were performing investigations or tasks related broadly to information handling; and in a companion directive (DCID 1/15) the IHC was to foster improved codes and standards for data elements, in order to promote a more orderly and efficient interchange of computerized information in organized data bases.

3. From 1968 until the spring of 1973, during the tenure of the IHC's first chairman, Major General Robert Taylor III (USAF (Ret.)), the IHC Support Staff (IHC/SS) and the committee structure diligently addressed the foregoing spectrum of activities. Their principal successes during this period, in my opinion, were:

- a. to provide a very useful forum for the working level exchange of technical information on planned automated systems within the community, and

- b. to urge successfully that the DCI continue the existence of the Information Science Center as a community training facility under the administration of CIA's Office of Training, after DIA found itself unable to continue to fund and administer this activity.

4. The IHC record from 1968 through the ending of the period in early 1973 when Mr. Helms was DCI was one of only modest accomplishment. Why this was so should be evaluated in the light of the status in those years of the concept of community coordination and the DCI's role. Mr. Helms' actions to fulfill that role were much more limited and less forceful than those initiatives subsequently undertaken by Dr. Schlesinger and Mr. Colby.

- a. In the Schlesinger/Colby period since early 1973, the need for more effective community interaction and coordination on an across-the-board basis has been stimulated and made self-evident by the increasingly severe shortages of money and manpower available to intelligence organizations. The President's directive to the DCI of November 1971, drafted in part by Dr. Schlesinger, has now come to provide a new era point of reference for an expanded DCI community role. The recent tendency by OMB and the Congress to look increasingly to the DCI to present and to justify the annual intelligence program/budget has tended to promote and enforce greater community coordination on all subjects.

b. By contrast, in the 1968-1973 period, there was a lesser degree of acceptance at top management levels of the immediate need for coordinated intelligence community action. In those years, the 20 year old tradition of parochialism by all of the intelligence organizations in the so-called community showed only limited signs of receding, and in practice all of them continued to protect their comfortable, long-accustomed autonomy.

(1) For example, in this period the development of an automated Consolidated Intelligence Resources Information System (CIRIS) for the community only came about at OMB insistence, and CIRIS suffered through a painful development stage wherein there was great reluctance on the part of top management in the individual organizations to provide timely and meaningful target- and function-oriented information on their money and manpower resources. ✓

(2) In this period, COINS -- the Community On-Line Intelligence System designed to assist intelligence analysts to gain access to substantive information across organization lines -- stayed alive and made slow progress largely through ad hoc support from DIA and NSA, along with the energetic and somewhat unorthodox initiatives of the COINS Project Manager. In spite of its original sponsorship by the PFIAB, agreed to by the DCI and the community, in those years COINS received more lip service and unkind comments than it did real support as a community experiment, intended as it was to explore the significance of automation for intelligence analysts and to establish a prototype system for interagency substantive information exchanges. ✓

c. The 1968-1973 era was characterized by a further important factor that made major IHC tasks impossible of accomplishment. It was, simply stated, that the DCI and other top management in intelligence -- by and large and with some exceptions -- were not versed in the technical aspects of mathematics, engineering, computer science, et al., which underlay the development of increasingly versatile automated systems. Nor, given their major and demanding responsibilities of general management, did these people have the time, disposition or desire to master those subjects. Any top manager must make difficult practical choices as to which topics he will master and which, with some feeling of unease, he will intentionally put "on the back burner" or "in the closet."

(1) The record is clear from Mr. Helms' own words that he placed computerization in the latter category.

(2) He utilized the Chairman, IHC, in effect, to hold off the PFIAB, and the DCI did not serve as a visible catalyst to mobilize the intelligence community's disparate parts to address the future of automation for intelligence functions.

(3) No committee, particularly not one that worked diligently, should be charged with ineffectiveness or failure when called upon to achieve difficult goals in which top management had overtly expressed disinterest.

5. To complete this historical survey, General Taylor gave up his DCI/IHC duties in the spring of 1973. The IHC remained without a leader until the fall of 1973 when the present incumbent was designated as Acting Chairman. Because of increasingly severe manpower reductions imposed on intelligence agencies, coupled with the aforementioned disinterest by top management, the staff support to IHC attrited away.\* The final reduction came in the fall of 1973 when the Intelligence Community Staff (ICS) table of organization wiped out the post of IHC Executive Secretary and eliminated one of the two remaining secretarial billets. For the past 15 months, therefore, the total staffing for the IHC has been the billets of chairman and one secretary/intelligence assistant provided from the ICS T/O, one middle grade professional provided on an NSA billet and one of same provided on a DIA billet. No IHC Support Staff representation is now provided either by CIA or by State/INR.

6. The present incumbent made unsuccessful post facto remonstrances to the IC Staff front office at the loss of the two above positions. In effect, therefore, my general guidance as Acting Chairman was to do what I thought was most important to the extent possible with the people available. Concurrently, in 1973 the DCI instructed the D/DCI/IC to study all USIB committees to recommend possible changes in the entire USIB structure, and in this connection the question was raised as to whether the IHC might well be abolished and replaced by a single individual to serve as an IC Staff Information Handling Coordinator. The Acting Chairman, IHC was called on to make a survey and report on this alternative. Mid-1973 was the nadir of the IHC. There was at that point no crystallized conviction that information handling should be taken out of the closet to which the former DCI had consigned it.

7. However, the pendulum was swinging, and new factors began to come into the community information handling equation, one by one. Initially, they made no pattern. Today, by contrast, they make a powerful pattern that leads to the conclusions in this paper. What were those factors? They included:

a. Dr. Schlesinger's continuing insistence (originally reflected in his drafting of the President's November 1971 letter to the DCI) that intelligence products must be signi-

\* - The staff originally had 7 professional and 3 secretarial positions

ificantly improved and users better served. This in turn led to a new focus on improved techniques and methodologies for both analysis and for presentation of intelligence materials. Frequently, the new techniques depended on computer capabilities for data manipulation and presentation. Looking for this kind of technical experience on the IC Staff led to the Chairman, IHC and the IHC Support Staff.

b. General Graham, as D/DCI/IC, exhibited a strong interest in improvements for production and presentation, paralleling Dr. Schlesinger's. In addition, General Graham's concern for better handling of intelligence in crisis situations and the need to understand better how intelligence organizations have performed in crises led to initiatives in the area of telecommunications and data handling.

(1) Exploring and testing new approaches to the handling of intelligence information in crisis operations was assigned to [redacted] who came to the IC Staff with [redacted] as a break in his distinguished career as the Historian for the Air Force.

[redacted]

(3) [redacted] moreover, began insistently to ask the question in DCI circles: what can automated techniques, perhaps a la Walter Cronkite, do to better assist high level consumers to receive intelligence products, noting that different consumers have varying preferences as to the forms in which they can most effectively receive and digest intelligence outputs.

c. General Allen, as D/DCI/IC and thereafter as Director, NSA, is one of the senior managers in the community who readily and in depth perceived the significance of the revolution in automation that is impending during the remainder of this decade and into the 1980s. He not only supported [redacted] initiatives mentioned above through the use of NSA resources, but also he repeatedly called attention to the proliferation of incompatible and expensive automated sub-systems already growing up through the community and almost totally lacking in the capability to be easily interconnected into cost/effective total community systems and networks. He suggested to the DCI that the IHC serve as a community focal point to study this problem.

d. Dr. Hall, ASD(I), accepted the charge from Dr. Schlesinger as DCI, to be the Executive Agent (under IRAC auspices) for the further development of COINS. The ASD(I) staff, along with the COINS Project Management Office, has in the past year moved ahead a good ways in planning and contracting for an upgraded community telecommunications network, using mini-computers at several nodes in the net to handle net communications and to interface with host computers in the several agencies.

(1) Concurrently, the decision was made to upgrade the COINS net to include NPIC-type information. This has resulted in a very large increase in net usage, and NPIC now is called on to respond to well over 50% of the total COINS inquiries.

(2) The COINS net now extends to remote terminals located from EUCOM to Taiwan and South Korea.

(3) When ASD(I) was made Executive Agent for COINS, the Chairman, IHC was designated as the DCI's continuing representative to monitor COINS developments.

e. Dr. Jack Martin, originally AD/DCI/IC and subsequently SA/DCI, has served as a focal point to stimulate activities both in intelligence agencies and among external R&D contractor organizations to further explore automated capabilities for new departures in analyst work and in intelligence presentation techniques. Chairman, IHC and the Support Staff provided the principal support for Dr. Martin in a number of his inquiries, and the Chairman, IHC inherited his external contacts when he transferred to the office of the Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for R&D. Dr. Martin's interest in this topic continues and he remains a valuable resource for the DCI and IHC.

f. Director, NPIC has taken an initiative to sponsor a community investigation (INVIDEX) of the need for rapid dissemination of high quality imagery to Washington area analysts, PIs and consumers. Chairman, IHC has participated throughout this year-long exercise, the results of which are a recommendation now in the DCI's office to establish such a system. The DD/I and DD/S&T endorsements on the INVIDEX study, now being prepared, call on the IHC to serve as the focal point for future community action to elaborate on these requirements and to monitor the development of a responsive capability.

g. General Wilson, D/DCI/IC, and General Kulpa, PD/DCI/IC, have recently taken initiatives with respect to imagery planning. Chairman, IHC is charged with a sizeable role in this effort.

h. There are other examples. An important group includes those initiatives that are making their way upward to top management, stimulated by working level analysts who have persuaded their immediate office superiors that modest capabilities should be created in several offices that can explore how new automated techniques can assist particular types of intelligence analysis.

(1) In CIA these exist in OER, OPR, OCI, OSR and ORD, and probably elsewhere. The CIA/CRS plan to develop through Project SAFE a large automated system with analyst terminals is another example -- and one in which the DCI has instructed that the IHC should be the medium to introduce SAFE to the community in order to foster a multi-agency dialog on this kind of development.

(2) Mr. Colby's current Perspectives for Intelligence states that we must make the analyst comfortable with automated tools. This and other statements by Mr. Colby are clear indication that he recognizes the issue and desires to move in an orderly way to cope with its problems and take advantage of its capabilities.

(3) Numerous sizeable efforts exist in other agencies -- e.g., the Navy's NOSIC, the Army's Project ASSIST, the Air Force/RAND PACER project, the DIA/DI upgrade of the NMIC, the DIA/DC plan for IRDHS, the ARPA projects to improve indications and warning intelligence procedures.

And on and on. In spite of our slender resources, Chairman, IHC and the two-man IHC Support Staff have a finger on the pulse in each of these cases.

i. Who is charged with concern for whether these individual systems are being planned to optimize their usefulness from a community point of view? The Intelligence R&D Council has recently decided it ought to look into this, and Chairman, IHC is involved in that effort. But on a continuing, day-to-day basis at the working level, no one other than the IHC is currently charged with monitoring and commenting on these proliferating systems with the interests of the total community in mind.

8. The foregoing are some of the isolated events that have begun to merge into the statement of a community problem, namely, how to be aware early-on of such proposals, how to evaluate them, how to impact on them constructively from a community point of view, how to catalog, describe and explain their capabilities and introduce them to analysts, how to ensure that their development directly serves to improve the



quality, timeliness and effective presentation of intelligence materials and products.

*There is no mechanism in being now to readily catalog, describe, evaluate and present the related costs for all of these proliferating systems and capable of keeping track of this on a continuing basis?*

a. Would top management of the community be disturbed to learn that there is no mechanism in being now to readily catalog, describe, evaluate and present the related costs for all of these proliferating systems and capable of keeping track of this on a continuing basis?

b. Nor has the intelligence community budget ever been sliced in a way to permit an orderly, detailed examination and review of all of these major systems and projects in relation to each other as one program package. This is not the only, and perhaps not even the best, way to look at these large resources, but it is another perspective that has not been attempted.

c. The intelligence community today is incapable of providing a rapid, well-prepared, consolidated, technically profound response on either of the two above points if, for example, a Congressional inquiry should ask to be informed as to who in the intelligence community has computers, where are they, what do they do, what do they cost, what kind are they, how are they being used, and why is all of this necessary.

d. This is to warn that such questions should be expected. The DCI's 1974 annual report to the President states that about 15% of the total community budget relates to this family of activities. One should reasonably anticipate that this statement will eventually evoke requests for more details. I know that such details do not exist in readily-packaged form today because I am the source of the 15% estimate.

9. It is vividly clear now that automation in the intelligence community has escaped from the closet to which it was consigned a few years ago. Moreover, the rapid rate of expansion of technical capabilities in computer hardware that we have experienced in the 1970s is going to continue. One rule of thumb is that the hardware doubles in capability and decreases by half in cost about every two years. Projections by the Defense Communications Agency cited in a current Rand Corporation report are that by 1985 the Department of Defense will be using over 80,000 computer terminals and several thousand computers. Projections by the international Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) are that by about 1980 it will clearly be less expensive to perform most information handling tasks by computers than by humans. Also, one should note the information explosions to be anticipated because of the capabilities of future intelligence collection systems. Add, moreover, OECD projections that the

volume of knowledge to be processed will have increased 4 to 7 times in 15 years. This represents new knowledge on the one hand, and new combinations and permutations for associating existing knowledge on the other. The OECD report notes that the day is in sight when we must "automate or suffocate" as far as knowledge handling is concerned.

10. Finally, add to the equation that the PFIAB continued in the fall of 1973 to ask the DCI what he planned to do about gaining a comprehensive picture of community automated information handling and preparing and thereafter monitoring a master community concept within which the several intelligence organizations could rationally develop subsystems. In December, 1973 Mr. Colby gave to the Chairman, PFIAB his renewed assurances that he was aware of these problems and intended to address them. The IHC was identified in the DCI's letter as one of his tools to serve this purpose.

11. The case, then, is this. The genie of automation is out of the bottle and out of the closet. It poses a big, costly and very technical problem that needs to be addressed -- and can only be addressed by the DCI -- from the standpoint of the total community. Managers in intelligence organizations who expressed voluble disinterest in this problem a year ago are now testifying in writing on their profound conversion.

12. With the foregoing as background, what about the IHC? My inquiry last fall as to whether such a committee was needed at all was overtaken by events which themselves answered that question in the affirmative. The evidence that an IHC is needed includes:

- a. ASD(I) sought and received DCI approval to participate in the IHC.
- b. The DCI, as noted earlier, advised the PFIAB of his intention to use the IHC.
- c. Dr. Martin has transferred his uncompleted initiatives to the Chairman, IHC for committee action.
- d. Director, NSA and Director, NPIC have both called for the IHC to play a role in the study of proliferating computerized nets.
- e. Chairman, COMIREX established a group to explore this subject as it affects his sensors, and a close, continuing working relation has now developed between COMIREX and the IHC which is important to both organizations.
- f. DIA is in the process of establishing a new Information Systems Office -- to centralize computer resources

somewhat comparably to CIA/OJCS -- and the head of that DIA office is that agency's IHC member.

g. IHC has developed a dialog with ARPA, one of the results of which has been to enable several CIA analytic offices and OJCS to conduct a presently on-going exploration of the use of the ARPA network. This ARPA support is being provided at no cost to CIA. Moreover, the cultivation of ARPA by Dr. Belden and Chairman, IHC offers hopeful prospects for obtaining funding by ARPA of some developmental work of direct benefit to the IC Staff and the intelligence community -- work which was cut out of the IHC budget request to the IC Staff. ARPA has now been approved by the DCI for associate membership in IHC.

The foregoing is not a complete record, but it is enough to illustrate that a mechanism like the IHC is very much needed today to serve the goal of community coordination.

13. But let us quickly make a disclaimer. The existing charter of the IHC is very broad. Capabilities at present of the Chairman and of the IHC Support Staff are disproportionately limited. This paper does not advocate that the IHC should be staffed up to capture the world or to supercede or take charge of existing committees and undertakings. Where existing mechanisms are performing effectively and with a community orientation -- regardless of their bureaucratic sponsorship -- they should be supported. The style of operation of the IHC should be, first, to help others, where they in fact exist, to do their assigned tasks, and to stake out an independent claim only in the case where an important community problem exists and is not otherwise being attended to. The IHC does, however, need to possess a good, current comprehension of all that is somehow going on within the spectrum of activities laid out for the IHC in the DCIDs.

14. The preceding illustrations give testimony that the Chairman, IHC has been quite fully occupied on many fronts since assigned to that position some 15 months ago. A great deal of this has involved the technico-diplomatic task of establishing new interagency arrangements for addressing mutual information handling system problems. This task has required bureaucratic finesse, a broad appreciation of organizational sensitivities, and an extensive knowledge of intelligence functions. Tasks of this sort can only be done by the Chairman in person, or by a very experienced, senior person who can act for the Chairman (such a person does not now exist). These tasks require a true "purple suit" approach, as well as a demonstration of objectivity and impartiality that can induce competing parties to look to a common point for fair mediation and resolution. The role of Chairman, IHC embraces being a fund raiser, a father confessor, a placator of bureaucratic fears, and a sales representative advancing the concept of "For the DCI and the Community," as an extension of "For God and Country."

15. The two-man IHC Support Staff, provided by DIA and NSA, has been occupied with technical tasks, providing impetus and community focus for several specific assignments levied on the IHC. These sizeable tasks include:

a. The reactivation of and guidance for a community data standards panel.

b. The extensive recompilation and publication of an automated community inventory of intelligence data systems and procedures.

c. Making technical arrangements for support of all of Dr. Belden's crisis operations procedures: such as, the establishment of the NOIWON, the development and testing of an interagency system for conferenced text editing (CONTEXT), the tracking of the intelligence and operations communities nervous system through which crisis communications flow, etc.

d. Making arrangements for interchanges of information and plans about new and on-coming automated systems, to foster community inputs in re specific projects of individual agencies -- e.g., the introduction of CIA's Project SAFE to external agencies and the promotion of working level dialogs on such topics.

e. Servicing a constant flow of working level inquiries and interchanges that are the non-glamorous daily substance by which an interagency committee receives nourishment and through which the members maintain their interest in a common forum.

f. Working with other community instrumentalities, such as the IC Staff, to provide data on information handling topics, and other USIB Committees with problems involving areas of IHC competence.

g. The single secretary/intelligence assistant assigned at present to IHC is being called on increasingly to perform professional duties, and with the advent of the CONTEXT experiment she will be occupied for a major part of each day participating in that project.

The DIA representative on the IHC Support Staff rotated in January 1975 and the NSA representative is due to rotate in March. These changes will necessitate a sizeable investment by Chairman, IHC to orient and train the replacements so that they may be able to operate effectively and with some degree of independence in the CIA/DCI environment which to an outsider is initially strange and is also characterized by unmarked bureaucratic pitfalls.

16. The nub of the problem of the IHC and its Support Staff is the total imbalance between the spectrum of information handling, information presentation, automation and telecommunications problems that the community now faces and the manpower resources available to the Chairman, IHC to address those matters. The recently-issued DCID 1/3 speaks of the support that is to be provided to USIB committees. The IHC is, I submit, unique in the lack of support now available to it.

- a. It has no Executive Secretary, in spite of DCID 1/3.
- b. It has no person of experience to serve where necessary as an alternate to the Chairman in dealing with sensitive matters of bureaucratic coordination and interagency competition.
- c. There is no one with any depth of technical expertise either in computer science or telecommunications on the IHC Support Staff.
- d. Neither CIA nor State/INR provide participants for the IHC Support Staff.
- e. The scant secretarial support is a serious limitation. As noted above, the single person available is projected to be an intelligence assistant and not a secretary. She is about to be preempted for the major part of several months to participate in Project CONTEXT. No satisfactory provision is made now for occasions when she is absent from the office on leave.
- f. Most important, most USIB committees are chaired by persons who are, also, the directors of sizeable line or staff offices, and they can draw from that pool of personnel to handle USIB committee business as needed. There are, I believe, only three exceptions, as follows:

(1) COMIREX - which has a large staff of its own.

(2) The Security Committee - which has a long history of close working relations with the CIA Office of Security from which support is available.

(3) IHC - The Chairman controls absolutely no external resources and is not an office chief.

17. To make the situation even more difficult, the task assigned to the Chairman, IHC is to gain back for the DCI and the community a reasonable degree of the influence and initiative that was permitted to wither away between 1968 and 1973. The IHC members are well qualified technically, they hold responsible positions in their parent organizations, and as individuals they believe there is a pressing need for greater community coordination. However, those members are

committed by their own organizations to support their own projects. It comes down to this:

-- The effectiveness and productivity of the IHC depends on the skill and drive of the Chairman, and on the availability of an adequate staff to follow through on committee assignments on a day to day basis. Without a Support Staff member as a straw boss for each project, the committee record will be largely ineffective.

18. We come at last to the end of the skein. There is a severe imbalance between the mission of the IHC -- which, I submit, is validly stated in the existing DCIDs -- and the capabilities of the Chairman and the Support Staff to accomplish the mission with the means presently available and in the face of the problems which are opposed.

19. I would very much like to have the opportunity to continue to address these problems on behalf of the DCI and the IC Staff -- provided resources are available commensurate with the responsibilities assigned.

-- What I have done in the past 15 months as Chairman, IHC has been to preserve the DCI's community credibility and his status as a community leader relative to these topics. We have preserved his opportunity to lead rather than to let it go by default.

-- Now we face the test of whether that opportunity is to be used on behalf of the community.

-- My efforts to date, when realistically compared to the scope of these problems, amount to a well built Potemkin village.

-- To continue in this manner can only result both for me and for the DCI in personal failure and frustration. That is an unacceptable alternative.

20. Attachment 4 is my proposal for a modest, minimum level of additional staffing that I recommend be made available now for the IHC Support Staff. This is based on the assumption that the mission of the Committee should be approximately as stated in existing DCIDs, and as that mission has been supplemented by subsequent instructions that I have received from the DCI and the D/DCI/IC. With that help I can produce respectable accomplishments; without it, no one can.

Respectfully submitted.

[Redacted Signature]

Chairman, IHC

STAT

STAT

Approved For Release 2004/03/26 : CIA-RDP80M01133A000700050009-8

Approved For Release 2004/03/26 : CIA-RDP80M01133A000700050009-8

Att. 1



25X1

Approved For Release 2004/03/26 : CIA-RDP80M01133A000700050009-8

Next 4 Page(s) In Document Exempt

Approved For Release 2004/03/26 : CIA-RDP80M01133A000700050009-8

Att. 2